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SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION				PROJECT CRYPTONYM AEDOGMA			
	TYPE OF ACTION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FI/CI		<input type="checkbox"/> CA			
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION SR					
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION C					
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RENEWAL FY 1961-62	BRANCH SR/2		DESK CE-France			
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER C					
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 2607	BUILDING J	EXTENSION 8251			
CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION							
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED			
				YES	NO	DATE	
C/SR/2	<i>[Signature]</i>	Aug 10, 61					
SR/B&F	<i>[Signature]</i>	Aug 11, 61					
SR/SS	<i>[Signature]</i>	8/11/61					
SR/PERS	<i>[Signature]</i>	8-11-61					
SR/DCOP	<i>[Signature]</i>	8/28/61					
SR/C/CI	<i>[Signature]</i>						
DC/SR	<i>[Signature]</i>						
CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS							
WE/3	<i>[Signature]</i>	8/31/61					
DDP/PG	<i>[Signature]</i>						
APPROVAL							
PERIOD		TOTAL AMOUNT		FY	AMOUNT		
FROM 1 Feb 61	TO 31 Jan 62			1961	\$ 3,498.30 3415		

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR Division

SUBJECT : Approval for Renewal of Project AEDOGMA

1. It is requested that Chief, SR Division approve renewal of Project AEDOGMA for the period 1 February 1961 through 31 January 1962.

2. Current Objectives:

a. The agent will cover the efforts of the Soviet Intelligence Services to exploit for intelligence purposes in France, Soviet and Eastern European displaced nationals and emigres.

b. The agent will act as a spotter in Soviet emigre circles who, incidental to other duties, can locate REDSKIN opportunities such as repatriates, persons visiting the USSR, persons in regular correspondence with the USSR, etc. Because the agent is believed to be well-known to the RIS as AIS, he will not develop any REDSKIN leads but will pass his prospects over to the Station, which will find other agents to conduct the necessary assessment and recruitment.

c. The agent will upon request lend aid and support to certain FP activities aimed against the Soviets. This employment will be of such nature that his participation in it will be entirely clandestine and will have no adverse effects on his cover or attract Soviet attention to him.

d. A new objective proposed for the coming year is an increased effort to use more AEDOGMA/1 leads to induce French liaison to be more cooperative in the exchange of information on RIS activities.

3. Changes:

The project continues to employ a single agent.

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4. Intelligence Production:

a. AEDOGMA/1's production has been mainly in fulfillment of Objective A during the past period of activity in Paris. There have been relatively few instances of his spotting REDSKIN agents, and none of these leads have been used for FI or PP purposes. In regard to Objective A, AEDOGMA/1's production has returned to the expected level now that he has established his contacts in Paris. He has reported on and is continuing to report on several emigres in Paris who have been connected with Soviet intelligence there. In one instance, AEDOGMA/1 was cut in on the delivery of a letter containing S/W to a suspect RIS agent. In this case, the matter was of particular interest to the CIA because the letter came from the United States.

b. It is believed that the project's production is justified in a two-fold sense: for the occasional CE information on the emigre community that affects the security of the United States; and for the run-of-the-mill information on Soviet intelligence activity as it can be used to pry information on the RIS from French liaison. The French service is particularly interested in the emigre field since the arrest of the emigre DEMYDCZUK and the departure of DEMYDCZUK's Soviet case officer, Vasily MYAKUSHO.

5. Effectiveness:

a. The agent has been most effective in supplying data on the network of Ukrainian emigres in the employ of Vasily MYAKUSHO. Although most of these suspect agents seem to pose a threat to the internal security of France rather than that of the United States, there have been exceptions. In early November 1960, one Dmytro GNYP asked AEDOGMA/1 to deliver mail to one Antin NYCZPORUK, who was confined in a mental hospital in the outskirts of Paris. The mail was addressed to NYCZPORUK in care of GNYP. GNYP's excuse for making the request was his fear of police investigation of his connections with Vasily MYAKUSHO. One of the two letters given to AEDOGMA/1 was from Semen POHORILIW, a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. According to TSD technicians, this letter contained secret writing, but TSD efforts to develop the S/W were unsuccessful. The FBI has been informed of this matter. The [] now plans to confer with French liaison on the internal French aspects of the GNYP-NYCZPORUK-POHORILIW matter and other leads relevant to the MYAKUSHO case.

0000 0000 0246

b. Although the REDSKIN objective of the project has been negligible to date, it is probable that it will figure more heavily in the next year of the project. During August and September 1961, France and the USSR are staging expositions in each other's country. The French Government, in its search for interpreters and guides for its Moscow exposition, has found it necessary to rely on emigres for 40% of the approximately 200 guides and interpreters they will employ. It is hoped that within this group and among representatives of the French firms participating in the Exposition that AEDOGMA/1 will provide a useful number of leads.

c. In regard to the Soviet exposition in Paris, it is most likely that the agent will be useful in ferreting out any RIS activity conducted from the exposition. Considering the size, it is quite likely the French will be appreciative of any support we can provide for their counter-intelligence task.

d. In summation of the current and anticipated effectiveness of the project, we believe that in addition to AEDOGMA/1's CI value for improving the production from our liaison with the French, his contribution of counter-intelligence items affecting the security of the United States, and his prospective REDSKIN usefulness, that his mere presence in Paris has some effect on the RIS. Although indeterminable, it follows from the RIS's well established pre-occupation with emigres and the RIS's particular action against AEDOGMA/1 (other double agents have been assigned AEDOGMA/1 as an EEI and one double agent was instructed to prepare a defamatory leaflet on AEDOGMA/1) that AEDOGMA/1 in Paris serves as a provocation against the legal KGB residency in France and to that extent hampers the operation of the KGB in France.

6. Problems: AEDOGMA/1's current connections with UPHILL, past association with suspect RIS agents, and his non-admittance of the existence of his legal wife prior to her appearance in the West in 1954, constitute the major security problems. To resolve these problems, we have, on recommendation of the CI staff, rechecked CIA files in Germany for information on Subject and his wives. A request has been sent to Munich to discuss with UPHILL our mutual employment of AEDOGMA/1; to determine the extent of his activities for them; to learn whether they are incompatible with his activities for us; and to advise them of CIA's doubts of the agent. A reply has not yet been received from UPHILL. Following the receipt of information on

0000 0000 0247

the discussions with UPHILL, we plan to check on the activities of his wife and mistress, who are now residing in the United States and Canada, respectively.

7. Liaison: As stated above, we expect to profit by using AEDOGMA/1 leads in RIS activities among the emigre community in France as priming material to effect a greater return of French information on RIS activities in France as they reflect RIS modus operandi, and Soviet intentions and capabilities.

8. Interagency Coordination: Some of AEDOGMA/1's information on emigre intelligence activity has concerned persons who have emigrated to the United States. The pertinent counter-intelligence information has been disseminated to the FBI, i.e., the GNYF-NYCZPORUK-POHORILIW matter. The FBI has been kept informed of our proposed action in Paris to insure that we do not jeopardize the Bureau's interest in this affair.

9. Plans:

a. As stated above, it is anticipated that AEDOGMA/1 will continue to produce information on Ukrainian emigres in contact with the Soviet intelligence services and that this information may be useful in improving our relationship with French liaison. It is also expected that he will continue to produce counter-intelligence items affecting the security of the United States. It is hoped that the agent will be able to produce information of value to the REDSKIN program, particularly with regard to the two expositions being held in France and the USSR.

b. [] was advised in February 1961 that it should be mutually understood that if this project was renewed, the production from it would be under the closest scrutiny. Headquarters advised that they were aware of AEDOGMA/1's potential value [] and were anxious for him to prove his worth, but that we were also aware of his shortcomings, both personal and professional, and that unless he could be directed during this project year to sway the balance of opinion unquestionably in his favor, producing above the marginal level, recommendation for termination would be made. (OPFW-29745, 16 February 1961.) [] requested renewal of the project with the objectives set out above and agreed that it should prove its worth by January 1962, or be terminated. [] 3850, March 1961.)

0000 0000 0248

c. During July 1961, a security review of all ☐ operations was conducted by KUBARK because of problems encountered with the French liaison service. ☐ concluded that AEDOGMA/1 was personally secure and exposure of contact with him to the French would offer only minimal embarrassment to KUBARK. ☐ advised, however, that the case would be reviewed and they would probably recommend that it be terminated. No reasons were given for this statement and the review has not been received at Headquarters.

10. Costs:

a. During the period 1 February 1960 through 31 January 1961, the operation cost \$9,834.43. Of this amount, \$2,400 was placed in the agent's escrow account in the U.S. and the balance, \$7,434.43 was salary, housing and operational expenses paid in the field.

b. It is estimated that for the period 1 February 1961 through 31 January 1962, the project will cost \$8,396.00, broken down as follows:

Salary (escrow)	\$2,400.00
Salary (local in francs)	2,400.00
Raise to offset income lost in transfer to Paris	300.00
Rent living quarters	1,800.00
Year end bonus	200.00
Health Insurance premiums	96.00
Operational expenses	<u>1,200.00</u>
TOTAL	\$8,396.00

I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

SR OBLIG REP NO. _____

SR ALLOTMENT NO. 134-4008-5279

☐ AUTHORIZED OFFICER ☐

☐ Chief, SR/2 ☒